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Abstract 
Good corporate governance is directly linked with the shareholder wealth creation 
and thereby influence the overall economic prosperity of entities. Firm value is 
regarded as one of the indicators for the creation of a wealth of an entity. Hence, the 
purpose of this study is to examine how corporate governance practices impact on the 
firm value. Data was collected through reviewing the annual reports of 27 Sri Lankan 
manufacturing firms listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2016. The 
study used descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis to analyze data. 
Findings revealed that the number of board meetings of listed manufacturing 
companies capable of improving firm value. Further, we identified that the control and 
risk management system of manufacturing entities positively impact firm value while 
board size and the board committees do not contribute significantly to improve the 
firm value of manufacturing sector entities in Sri Lanka.
The study has social and policy impact as it highlights the importance of corporate 
governance practices on improving the firm value of the Sri Lankan manufacturing 
sector. Focusing on one industry sector is an inherent limitation of the study, and 
industry sector comparison would be a potential future research area.
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1. Introduction
Increasing firm value in terms of 
shareholders’ wealth maximisation is 
the ultimate objective of every profit 
motive firm. Organisational strategies, 
structures, and processes are there to 
achieve the said objective within which 
organised structures of formal 
(regulations and laws) and informal 
(norms, values, and assumptions) that 
create constraints on the behavior of a 
related party (Cheffins, 2013). 
According to Cadbury (1992),  
Corporate Governance (CG) is the 
system by which companies are directed 
and controlled has succeeded in 
attracting a good deal of public interest 
over the years because of its ostensible 
importance for the economic health of 
companies and society in general in both 
developed and developing countries. 
The firms in developed countries have 
dispersed shareholders and operate 
within stable political and financial 
systems, well developed regulatory 
frameworks, and effective CG practices 
(Heenetigala  & Armstrong 2011; 
Yurtoglu, 2003). However, firms that 
operate in developing countries may be 
affected by political instability resulting 
in severe economic disruption, which 
results in a widening fiscal deficit 
(Harrison, 1981). Therefore, the capital 
markets which are exposed to economic 
and political instabilities may result in 
weaker CG resulting in negative value 
creation. Supporting to this argument, in 
the context of Sri Lanka, changes in 
governments that fluctuate between two 
major political parties, their different 
ideological perspectives, and ad-hoc 
changes on its governance mechanism 
in Sri Lanka has been adversely affected 
the economic development of Sri Lanka 
(Nagirikandalage & Binsardi, 2017). 
Additionally, political transformation in 
2015 with the theme of “good 
governance” paved the way to discuss 
and to highlight the importance of CG in 
Sri Lanka. Over last four years, the new 
government established the Financial 
Crime Investigation Division (FCID) 
intending to investigate major financial 
crimes, (e.g., frauds and illegal financial 
transactions) and the 19th amendment to 
the constitution established an 
Independent Audit Commission 
providing a legal assistance for financial 
investigations provided the necessity of 
sound CG system for all public and 
private sector companies. Further, 
recent business collapses such as 
Pramuka bank, Golden key, and Central 
bank bond scam  are the wakeup calls 
that rejuvenated the interest of good 
governance practices in Sri Lankan 
private and public entities. Several 
public and private entities (e.g., Sri 
Lankan Air Lines, EAP, Perpetual 
treasuries) were accused by recent 
investigations conducted by the 
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government on the poor CG. Therefore, 
all the public and private entities, 
government as well as the general public 
are interested in examining how the 
companies in Sri Lanka comply with 
good governance in controlling their 
business entities.  
CG initiatives in Sri Lanka commenced 
in 1997 with the introduction of the first 
report on voluntary code of best practice 
on matters relating to the financial 
aspects of CG. The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka set 
u p  a  c o m m i t t e e  t o  f o r m  
recommendations regarding the 
financial aspects of CG, with the support 
of the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE), 
and  Secu r i t i e s  and  Exchange  
Commission (SEC). The code directed 
towards all listed companies, unit trusts, 
fund management companies, finance 
companies, banks, and insurance 
companies for voluntary compliance. 
The code provided a broader operational 
structure for carrying out CG activities. 
The rules embedded in the code were 
primarily based on the Cadbury 
committee report (Senaratne & 
Gunaratne, 2008).  After several 
amendments, the revised code standard 
on CG for listed companies incorporated 
into the listing rules of the CSE, from 1st 
of April  2007 and subsequent 
amendments were made (e.g., 2013 
revisions) to cater timely needs of 
b u s i n e s s  a n d  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
environment in locally as well as 
internationally.
Many previous scholars(Black, Tang, & 
Kim, 2003; Brown & Caylor, 2006; 
Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; 
Kommunuri, Jandug, & Vesty, 2014; 
Lemmon & Lins, 2003) attempted to 
identify how the CG impact on the value 
generation process in firms. Those 
studies used different aspects of CG, 
various measures in firm performance 
and value, samples, methods, and 
methodologies. However, the findings 
are inconclusive. As an example, some 
studies found board size has a positive 
impact on the firm value (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Pearce & 
Zahra, 1992) while some studies found a 
negative effect (Cheng  2008; Forai & 
Amedro, 2004; Shakir, 2008) on the 
same. Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and 
Zimmermann (2004) did not detect any 
significant relationship between board 
size and firm value.
The Firm value is often referred to as an 
a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  e q u i t y  m a r k e t  
capitalization. It is a figure that 
theoretically represents the entire cost of 
a company if someone were to acquire. 
Enterprise value is a more accurate 
estimate of takeovercost than market 
capitalization because it includes 
several important factors such as 
preferred stock, debt (including bank 
loans and corporate bonds), as well as 
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backing out cash reserves(Brigham & 
Ehrhardt, 2002). Firm value is used 
regularly in business valuation, 
portfolio analysis, accounting, financial 
modelling, and risk analysis. It has 
become a fundamental economic 
measure that reflects the total value of 
the firm (Forai & Amedro, 2004). 
The most common methods of 
measuring company value are market 
capitalization and price-earnings ratio. 
Investors sometimes use economic 
value to compare returns between 
similar companies on a risk-adjusted 
basis. Some investors, particularly those 
who subscribe to a value investing 
philosophy, look for companies that are 
generating a lot of cash flow about 
enterprise value. Businesses that tend to 
fall into this category are more likely to 
require little additional reinvestment. 
Therefore, the literature provided 
divergent conclusions about the 
relationship between CG and firm value, 
with different models to measure firms’ 
value. 
The current study examined relevant 
previous Sri Lankan studies on CGand 
its impact on different corporate aspects. 
It is observed that the majority of studies 
have  focused  on  CGand f i rm 
performance (Achchuthan & Rajendran, 
2013; Azeez, 2015; Velnampy, 2013). 
However, many of the findings are 
inconclusive. Examples; Heenetigala 
and Armstrong (2011) found a positive 
relationship between CG and firm 
performance, while Velnampy (2013) 
found that determinants of CG are not 
correlated to firm performance. One of 
the recent studies (Danoshana & 
Ravivathani, 2019) has also focused on 
the impact of CG and firm performance 
and revealed a positive impact on forms 
performance. Annexure 1 summarizes 
some of the relevant studies on CG and 
firm performance in the Sri Lankan 
context. Thus, it is observed that there is 
a dearth of studies on CG and firm value. 
The lacuna of literature on CG and firm 
value creates a need for further studies 
with the most relevant firm value 
measurement like MVA.  
Accordingly, the main objective of this 
study is to examine how the CG 
practices impact on the firm value in Sri 
Lankan manufacturing firms. The rest of 
the paper is organized as the literature 
review, methodology, data analysis, 
findings, and conclusion.
2. Literature review
This section explains previous findings 
relating to the selected CGvariables and 
the firm value, namely, the board size, 
board meetings, board committees, the 
internal control system and risk 
management, and the hypothesis of the 
study. It also highlights prior insights on 
the firm value.
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2.1. Board size and firm value
Previous studies (Cheng  2008; Forai & 
Amedro, 2004; Kumar & Singh, 2013; 
Shakir, 2008) recognized that the board 
of directors as a significant aspect of 
sound CG mechanism. The role of the 
board of directors is crucial for the 
organizations, as they are the primary 
change agents of the organization 
(Shakir, 2008). Some previous studies 
have found a negative relationship 
between board size and firm value 
(Cheng  2008; Forai & Amedro, 2004; 
Kumar & Singh, 2013; Shakir, 2008; 
Yermack, 1996).
Large boards  suffer  f rom the  
dissemination of responsibility and 
aversive attitude towards monitoring 
managerial performance and risk-taking 
(Hermalin   & Weisbach  2001). 
However, with many members, the 
board may also find it challenging to 
staff various sub-committees such as the 
audit committee or remuneration 
committee. In large boards, members 
with diverse backgrounds bring 
knowledge and intellect to the board 
room (Dwivedi & Jain, 2005). The ideal 
size of a board is often recommended to 
be between seven, eight (Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, & Wells, 1998) or ten (Lipton 
& Lorsch, 1992). They argued that large 
boards might be less effective than small 
boards. Board size varies depending on 
the size and requirement of a company, 
and some studies establish a positive 
association between board size and firm 
performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Pearce 
& Zahra, 1992). However, Beiner et al. 
(2004) did not detect a significant 
relationship between board size and firm 
value for a sample of Swiss firms. Based 
on the literature, the first hypothesis that 
will be tested for the study is;
H1: There is a positive impact of board 
size on the firm value 
2.2. Board meetings and firm value
Vafeas (1999) indicated that the board 
meeting frequency influences firm 
performance and firm value.  A higher 
frequency of meetings is likely to result 
in superior performance (Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1992), enhance board oversight 
of senior management (Davila & 
Penalva, 2006), and it is a good proxy for 
the monitoring effort of directors 
(Vafeas, 1999). Frequent meetings also 
make faster the recovery from poor firm 
performance (Vafeas, 1999). To the 
opposite, Jackling and Johl (2009) 
found no relationship between board 
meetings and firm performance in a 
sample of Indian firms. Therefore, the 
second hypothesis that will be tested in 
the study is;
H2: The is a significant positive impact 
of the number of board meetings on the 
firm value
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2.3. Board committees and firm value
Cadbury (1992) recommended that 
boa rds  shou ld  nomina te  sub -
committees to address the following 
three functions: Audit committees to 
oversee the accounting procedures and 
external  audi ts ;  Remunera t ion  
committees to decide the pay of 
corporate executives, and nominating 
committees to nominate directors and 
officers to the board. Bilimoria and 
Piderit (1994), stated that the board 
committees provide a means and 
structure for effective governance by 
facilitating crucial tasks and addressing 
critical corporate concerns. Jiraporn, 
Singh, and Lee (2009) argued that board 
effectiveness is accomplished through 
board committees.
Kesner (1988) stated that the most 
important decisions of the board are 
initiated at the committee level. García-
Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2009) 
concluded that that audit committee 
independence is one of the primary 
mechanisms to constrain earnings 
management and assure the credibility of a 
firm’s financial statements. Therefore, the 
third hypothesis that will be tested is;
H3: There is a positive impact of board 
committees on the firm value
2.4. The internal control system, risk 
management, and firm value
Jensen (1993) stated that internal control 
systems, such as managerial incentives, 
corporate charters, and boards of 
directors, however, may not be 
suff ic ient  to  ensure  corporate  
transparency and the self-monitoring of 
firm behavior. Doyle, Ge, and McVay 
(2007) found no association of a CG 
quality index and the overall likelihood 
of disclosing material weaknesses. 
Given the normative theoretical 
prescriptions of early risk management 
theory, Smithson and Simkins (2005) 
found that company share prices do 
reflect the value of interest rate risk 
management in financial institutions, 
but the results are less clear when 
examining industrial companies. The 
risk management is beneficial to the 
firm because it reduces its tax payments 
(Smith & Stulz, 1985)financial distress 
costs (Stulz 1984), information 
a symmet ry  cos t s  (Breeden  & 
Viswanathan, 1998; DeMarzo & Duffie, 
1991; Stulz 1990)   and financing costs 
(Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993; 
Morellec & Smith, 2002). 
The current study expects a positive 
relationship between risk management 
and internal control with the firm value 
and developed the fourth hypothesis as;
H4: There is a positive impact of risk and 
internal control systems on the firm 
value
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2.5. Firm value 
The firm value can be measured either 
by using Economic Value Addition 
(EVA) or Market Value Addition 
(MVA). Economic value added (EVA) is 
the difference between the firm’s after-
tax return on capital and its cost of 
capital. Stewart (1991) defined EVA as a 
residual return that subtracts the cost of 
invested capital from net operating 
profit after tax. EVA is equal to the 
economic book value of the capital at the 
beginning of the year and the difference 
between its return on capital and cost of 
capital. Stewart (1991) defines MVA as 
the excess of the market value of capital 
(both debt and equity) over the book 
value of capital. He suggested that, if the 
MVA is positive, the company has 
created wealth for its shareholders.
Brigham and Ehrhardt (2002) 
stated that MVA represents the 
difference between the total market of a 
firm and the total amount of investor-
supplied capital. Invested capital, also 
known as capital employed, and it is the 
summation of equity and debt capital 
supplied by the firms’ shareholders and 
debt holders to finance assets. Positive 
MVA is a sign of shareholder value creation. 
Niresh and Thirunavukkarasu (2014) also 
stated that MVA is a wealth measurement 
tool in determining the return on the 
money invested in the company. There 
fore, positive MVA reflects that the 
money invested by the shareholder's 
yield returns, while the negative MVA is 
the vice versa. The current study used 
MVA as a proxy for firm value.
3. Methodology
This study focused on a positivist 
paradigm that seeks facts or causes of 
social phenomena, using deductive 
reasoning with quantitative techniques. 
The reasoning is deductive because the 
hypotheses were derived first, and the 
data were collected later to confirm or 
contradict the propositions. 
The largest industry sector in CSE is the 
bank, finance, and insurance sector that 
has been double regulated   and 
significantly different from other sectors 
(Imam & Malik, 2007; Kalainathan & 
Kaliaperumal, 2014)  in reporting in Sri 
Lanka. Therefore, the current study 
focused on the second-largest industry 
sector, i.e., the manufacturing sector, which 
has a significant contribution to the Sri 
Lankan economy.  
There were 38 listed manufacturing 
companies by 2017, and a total of 11 
companies have not published their 
annual reports (2012-2016) on the CSE 
website. Based on data availability 
(Kalainathan, 2015, p. 382), the study 
considered those 27 companies as the 
sample of the study, which represents 
71% of the total listed manufacturing 
companies.  
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Annual reports of the sample companies 
were examined (Ryan & Ng, 2000) in 
order to identify the relevant disclosures 
on selected CG variables. Accordingly, 
disclosures relating to the number of 
directors of the company, the number of 
board meetings, availability of board 
committees, internal controls and risk 
management were identified. 
To make sure the accuracy and 
reliability of the identified disclosures, 
two raters (participants) were employed 
to examine annual reports to gather CG 
data. Two participants examined each of 
the annual reports. It helped to check the 
initial inter-rater reliability of collecting 
data form annual reports. When there are 
variances in collecting CG information, 
participants discussed each other and 
identify the problems and rectify the 
data in the inaccurate form.  This 
process improved the accuracy and 
reliability of the CG measurement index 
and the collecting of data. 
As discussed in developing hypotheses, 
CG, i.e., the independent variable, was 
measured using four variables. Board 
size, board meetings, board committees, 
and Internal control system and risk 
management.  The board size was 
measured by counting the total number 
of directors serving on the board (Cheng  
2008; Forai & Amedro, 2004; Kumar & 
Singh, 2013; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 
2012; Shakir, 2008; Yermack, 1996).  
Studies measured the board size in 
different scales . The minimum number 
of directors for a company as per 
companies act No.7 of 2007 is given as 
one director in the Sri Lankan context. 
We further observed that the mean board 
size in manufacturing companies is six. 
Previous studies have found that there is 
a positive relationship between board 
size and firm value (Dalton et al., 1998; 
Pearce & Zahra, 1992).  Hence, the 
marks are given as 1-5 = 1, 6-10=2, >10 
= 3 (see, table 2). In terms of Board 
meetings, the minimum number of 
meetings as per  CG-Code (2017) is four 
meetings per year. Thus, it was 
considered as the cutoff to award marks.  
The presence or absence of committees 
is counted by the dichotomous approach 
in previous studies (Cheng & Courtenay, 
2006; Heenetigala, 2011; Laing & Weir, 
1999). If the company annual report 
disclosed that the internal control and 
risk management system is available, 1 
mark was awarded. As required by CG-
Code (2017), if all the committees  such 
as audit committee, nomination 
c o m m i t t e e ,  a n d  r e m u n e r a t i o n  
committees are available in a company 
one mark was awarded (Cheng & 
Courtenay, 2006) 
The dependent variable of the study is 
the firm’s value, which is measured 
using Market Value Added (MVA). 
Original value or book value is retrieved 
from annual reports, and the market 
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prices extracted from the Colombo 
Stock Exchange (CSE). Operationa-
4. Analysis and findings
 
Descriptive summary statistics of the 
firm value and the related CG variables 
for the companies in Sri Lanka are 
presented in Table 2. Descriptive 
statistics in the table can be viewed in 
terms of location (mean, median and 
mode) statistics, dispersion (standard 
deviation, interquartile range, and 
range) statistics and shape (skewness 
and kurtosis) statistics. As depicted in 
Table 2, the firm value is generated by 
finding the difference between the 
market value (MV) and the invested 
capital. 
lization of variables is summarized in 
Table 1.
Table 2 shows the center of the firm 
value ranges from 28.55 (median) to 70 
(mode). The interquartile range of the 
firm value is 60.52, suggesting the 
middle 50% of the data set ranges from 
lower quartile (3.49) and upper quartile 
(64.01). An overall marginal positive 
skewness of 0.97 exist although mode > 
mean > median (suggesting a negative 
skewness).  Also, descriptive statistics 
evident that average bard size (mean of 
2) of manufacturing entities in Sri Lanka 
is 6 to 10 directors. The mean, median, 
and mode concerning board meetings 
recording below Table 2 show that 
manufacturing companies hold less than 
- 24 -International Journal of Accounting & Business Finance Vol.5 Issue 2 2019
 
 
Variables investigated  Measurement Operationalization 
Independent Variables   
Board Size (BS) Number of directors in the company  1-5 = 1, 6-10=2, >10 = 3 
Board Meetings (BM) The number of meetings held per 
year. 
<4 = 1, 4= 2, >4 = 3 
Board Committees 
(BC) 
Availability of Audit committee, 
Nomination Committee, and 
Remuneration committee  
If yes 1, otherwise 0 
Internal control and 
risk management (IC) 
Availability of internal control 
system and risk management 
framework  
If yes 1, otherwise 0 
Dependent Variable  
Firm Value (FV)  Market Value Added (MVA)  
 
 
(Market value – Book value)* 
No. of shares issued
Table 1. Operationalization of the variables
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four meetings per year. The same 
measures concerning board committees 
revealed that, on average, manu 
facturing entities have a minimum of 
two subcommittees to the board. Data 
shows that all the manufacturing 
companies have formed internal control 
The data used in the analysis consist of 
both cross-sectional variations as well as 
time-series variation. For example, firm 
value has data ranging from 2012 to 
2016 for 27 different companies. Such 
data are known as panel (longitudinal) 
data, and we have used EViews to 
generate the Panel Least Squares 
Regression (PLSR) to incorporate the 
and risk management framework in their 
companies as part of good governance. 
However, in time-series analyses, we 
noted that the compliance level of all 
three variables relating to CG had been 
improved from 2012 to 2016
panel characteristics that exist in our 
data set. The PLSR for firm value is 
presented in Table 3. The adjusted R2 is 
77%, suggesting that the estimated 
regression cannot explain only 23% of 
the total variation. The P-value of the F-
statistic (0.0000) justifies the overall 
significance of the PLSR on the firm 
value. 
Table 2. Descriptive summary statistics
 
  Firm value 
Board 
size 
Board 
meetings 
Board 
committees 
Internal control 
& risk 
management 
Mean 38.73 1.9 1.63 1.76 1 
Median 28.55 2 1.5 1.67 1 
Mode 70 2 1 1.67 1 
Skewness 0.97 -0.48 0.92 -0.03 1.23 
Standard deviation 38.57 0.45 0.67 0.37 0.28 
Count 135 135 135 135 135 
 
Variable  Coefficient Std.error t-statistics Prob. 
C 32.24388 12.93082 2.493568 0.0143 
Board committees -8.883338 7.581350 -1.171736 0.2441 
Board meetings 8.195513 3.792154 2.161176 0.0331 
Board size -0.061673 3.905200 -0.015792 0.9874 
Intcontro & RM 30.17665 10.48107 2.879156 0.0049 
Table 3. Panel Least Squares Regression on Firm value
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The lowest Akaike, Schwartz, Hannan-
Quinn info criteria are used to pick the 
best model presented in Table 3 the 
explanatory variables in the estimated 
PLSR regression are the board 
committees, board meetings, board size, 
and in ternal  cont ro l  and r i sk  
management. Out of these four 
independent variables, only two are 
statistically significant. They are board 
meetings (with a P-value of 3.31%) and 
internal control and risk management 
(with a P-value of 0.49%). Accordingly, 
only hypotheses 2 and 4 can be accepted. 
The most significant explanatory 
variable of the firm value is the internal 
control and risk management (with the 
lowest P-value).  
5. Discussion and conclusion
Our finding of a significant positive 
relationship between board meetings 
and the MVA has complied with most of 
the previous studies. As an example, 
Vafeas (1999) and Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) concluded that a higher 
frequency of meetings is likely to result 
in superior performance and a better 
way to monitor efforts of directors as 
frequent meetings make faster the 
recovery from a poor firm performance. 
This finding also can be explained by 
using agency theory. Meetings are the 
primary space for the company’s 
decision making on behalf of owners. 
High frequency of meeting suggests that 
directors have put more effort and time 
for better decision making helping to 
improve the operational and financial 
performance and ultimately enhance the 
company value. 
The second significant finding for the 
internal control system and risk 
management also shows a significantly 
positive relationship on firm value. It 
provided evidence that the companies’ 
firm value is increased by better internal 
control and risk management through 
less financial distress costs (Stulz 1984), 
less information asymmetry costs 
(Breeden & Viswanathan, 1998; 
DeMarzo & Duffie, 1991; Stulz 1990) 
and less financing costs (Froot et al., 
1993; Morellec & Smith, 2002). On the 
other hand, internal controls are put in 
place to secure the organization from 
R squared 0.829682 
Adjusted R squared 0.771777 
Prob (F statistic) 0.000000 
Durbin Watson stst.  1.167716 
Akaike 8.883818 
Schwartz 9.637038 
Hannan-Quinn 9.189906 
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inappropriate and harmful actions of the 
employees and managers. Therefore, 
internal controls safeguard the 
organization from the conflict of 
interests. Proper risk management helps 
the organization in better decision 
making. Thus, the positive impact of 
internal control and risk management 
can be rationalized through agency 
theory.
Summing-up,the findings board 
meetings, and internal control and risk 
management framework show a 
significant impact on firm value while 
board size and board committees show 
an insignificant impact on firm value. 
Consequently, this study provides a 
useful insight for firms in Sri Lanka that 
are attempting to improve or implement 
CG structures. Due to the challenges 
faced by the Sri Lanka economy, it is 
necessary to build confidence in 
investors and other international 
agencies through reforms in CG, 
financial reporting, and corporate laws. 
Future researches need to be more focus 
on other CG variables and firm value 
since it will be useful for the investors 
and stakeholders. Focus on a single 
industry sector can be identified as a 
limitation of this study, and industry 
comparison on CG and firm value would 
be another future research avenue.
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Study  Data source  CG variables  Other 
variables  
Findings
Heenetigala  
and 
Armstrong 
(2011)
 
Sample of 37 companies selected 
from the top 50 listed
 
companies 
in The Lanka Monthly Digest 50 
(LMD) for the years 2003 and 
2007.
 
Separate leadership
 Board composition
 Board committee and 
 
ROA and 
Tobin’s Q
 
A positive relationship between 
CG and firm performance.
Guo and Kga 
(2012)
 
Sample of 174 listed firms in 
CSE for the financial year 2010
 
Board size Proportion 
of non-
 
executive 
directors in a board 
 
Director’s 
shareholdings CEO 
duality 
 
ROA
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
board size and proportion of non-
executive directors in the board 
showing a marginal negative 
relationship with firm value
The proportion of non-executive 
directors in a board and financial 
performance of the firm showing a 
negative relation
Velnampy 
(2013)
 
Sample of 28 manufacturing 
companies using the data 
representing the periods of 2007 
–
 
2011.
 
Board structure 
Board committee.
 
Board meeting 
 
Board size 
 
ROA
 
ROE
 
Determinants of corporate 
governance are not correlated to 
the performance measures of the 
organization
Achchuthan 
and Rajendran 
(2013)
 
Sample of 28 listed 
manufacturing firms for the 
period of 2007-
 
2011.
 
Board Leadership 
Structure
 
Proportionate of non-
 
executive directors in 
the board
 
Board Committees
 
Board Meeting
 
ROE
 
No significant mean difference 
between the firm performance 
among corporate governance 
practices
Dharmadasa, 
Gamage, and 
Herath (2014)
 
Sample of 189 companies listed 
in CSE for the year 2012/2013
 
CEO duality
 
Board size
 
Board independence
 
Family directors, 
Interlocking 
directorate Board 
diversity
 
ROA
 
Tobin’s Q
 
Larger boards are showing a 
negative impact on firm 
performance. A positive 
association between board 
independence and firm 
performance. CEO duality, family 
directors, interlocking directorate 
nor board diversity are not 
significant in increasing firm 
performance.
Azeez (2015) Sample of 100 listed companies 
in the Colombo Stock Exchange 
for the 2010-2012 financial years
Board Size
CEO duality 
Proportion of non-
executive directors
EPS
ROA
ROE
Board size is negatively associated 
with firm performance. CEO 
duality showing a significant 
positive relationship with the firm 
performance Non-executive 
directors on the board are not 
associated with firm Performance
Danoshana 
and 
Ravivathani 
(2019)
Sample of 25 listed financial 
institutions in the Colombo stock 
exchange for 2008-2012
Board Size
Audit committee
Number of meeting
ROA Board Size and audit committee 
are having a positive impact on 
forms performance while the 
number of meetings has a negative 
impact.
Annexure 1:
Recent related studies on Corporate Governance - Sri Lankan 
context 
